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The concept of public healthcare has perennially involved the institution of measures that are necessary for the prevention of large scale epidem-
ics. This preventive approach embodies principles of sanitation, water puri-
fication and more recently vaccination. However, the advent of new strains 
of viruses and an unprecedented increase in the susceptible population has 
expanded the ambit of primary healthcare to include effective treatment. 
Especially in developing countries, treatment through affordable medicines 
is considered fundamental to the achievement of public health goals. Thus, 
there exists a humanitarian obligation on the international community and 
the respective governments of nations, to provide effective medication to 
those who cannot afford it, in the larger interest of maintaining a sense of 
equity in the sustenance of human life. 
This paper analyses relevant international treaties and domestic judicial 
interventions that could effectuate positive change in the formulation of 
international trade and intellectual property policies, with regard to health-
care, at national as well as an supranational levels. The paper argues for 
the transfer of the decision making powers, with regard to the distribution 
of drugs, from the private pharmaceutical industry to the governments of 
countries. This, it argues, would result in a shift in prioritization from profit 
making motives, to the universal realization of the right to health.
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1. INTRODUCTION
“One third of the world’s population still lacks access to essential 
drugs while in the poorest parts of Africa and Asia, over fifty per 
cent of the population does not have regular access to the most vital 
essential drugs.”1 - M.Scholtz
This recent declaration of the World Health Organization (WHO) brought to light the deplorable status of a rapidly accelerating global health cri-
ses that currently plagues the developing world – the lack of availability of 
life saving medication. 2 It provided the necessary jolt of pragmatism and 
highlighted the imminent need to take affirmative action in order to save the 
lives of millions of people across the globe. This has in fact resulted in a shift 
of the concerns of production and supply of medicines; from merely an eco-
nomic driven intellectual property domain, towards the ambit of the preser-
vation of basic human rights. The issues of drug pricing funding innovation, 
foreign investment and economic growth in developing countries will now 
have to be read in context with the obligations of the governments to provide 
basic access to healthcare to their most impoverished citizens. 
There are numerous reasons for the lack of accessibility to essential 
medicines. Notably, the single most relevant cause is the unreasonable pric-
ing of drugs, which places some of the most vital medicines completely out 
of the reach of large populations living in the developing world. These ex-
clusionary prices are often the result of a stringent regime of Intellectual 
Property protection that seeks to safeguard the research, innovation and 
development of unique processes by pharmaceutical companies. While this 
is a fair incentive to encourage further study and recover costs, there is a 
definite need to balance this protection of individual ownership with a larg-
er interest of sustaining life through the realization of the overarching right 
to health.  
Significant efforts have been undertaken to reconcile these conflicting 
interests through international instruments of law and policy, including but 
not limited to treaties, regulations and nuanced recommendations. Inter-
national negotiation, in this regard, has been focussed on the protection of 
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individual effort while at the same time affording governments the requisite 
flexibility to take necessary measures to create effective healthcare systems. 
The WHO has begun to advocate that “generic production of drugs should 
begin upon patent expiration” and that “preferential pricing is necessary for 
lower income countries”3 
With a view to effectuate positive changes in the formulation of trade 
and intellectual property policies ,with regard to healthcare, at a national as 
well as an institutional level, this paper analyses relevant international trea-
ties and domestic judicial interventions. In doing so, it advocates the transfer 
of the decision making power, with regard to the distribution of drugs, from 
the private pharmaceutical industry to the governments of countries. This, it 
propounds, would result in a shift of prioritization from profit making mo-
tives, to the universal realization of the Right to Health. These internation-
ally endorsed policy decisions would inculcate self sufficiency, through the 
development of capacity building mechanisms such as generic production 
and compulsory licensing, in the developing world. It would thus effectively 
put an end to the trend of relegating the needs of the underprivileged to the 
contours of charitable dependency and staggered donations.
This paper is divided into five parts. After this introduction, part II 
of this paper provides a background on the existing conflict between the 
protection of individual effort and institutional innovation and the need to 
make socially beneficial knowledge universally accessible. Part III explores 
the shortcomings in the existing efforts to institute a system of affordable 
and accessible healthcare. Part IV reflects upon the emergence of an en-
forceable Right to Health; from what used to be a mere privilege.  It does 
this through an analysis of executive policies, legislative initiatives as well 
as judicial intervention that aim to facilitate the fulfilment of humanitarian 
obligations in effectuating the Right to Health. Finally, part V provides rec-
ommendations at a domestic as well as an institutional level, which would 
allow governments of countries to create effective instruments within which 
their most vulnerable populations would be able to enjoy an unfettered ac-
cess to affordable healthcare. 
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2. THE CRUX OF THE CONFLICT – INDIVIDUAL 
OWNERSHIP V. PUBLIC INTEREST
There exists a continuous conflict between two factions of international law, “soft law” and “hard law”. At the crux of this deliberation lies the 
seemingly opposing tenets of the perambulatory clauses of relevant treaties 
that emphasize the need for equity and universal social justice; and the spe-
cific provisions that propound the principles of free trade and entitlement 
to individual property. International law leaves the conciliation of these two 
divergent interests up to the state machinery, thus creating an environment 
of uncertainty and discord in balancing the preservation of individual rights 
with the needs of larger populations.4
For example, subjecting governmental policies that infringe upon indi-
vidual rights to judicial scrutiny would relegate placing these conflicting in-
terests in higher hierarchy to individuals who harbour specific views of judg-
es, which may not resonate with the interest of the masses. If a court finds 
that the only way a particular policy can fulfil a governmental objective is 
through the restriction of individual rights, then it will have to deliberate 
upon a scheme of prioritization which effectively upholds one at the cost of 
the other.5 Robert Axely reiterates the need for a mutually beneficial process 
of reconciling these diverging interests through his endorsement of tests of 
suitability and necessity. These focus on issues of facts; such as whether a par-
ticular measure does in fact result in the achievement of pre determined goals 
and if there are less restrictive ways of achieving similar results.6 The test of 
proportionality, however sheds light on a normative concern; primarily of 
whether gains to the public justify the interference with an individual right.7 
There have been a multitude of international platforms, established to 
create a conciliatory environment within the construct of which the reso-
lution of these incongruous appendages can be realized. These include the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO), the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UN-
AID),United Nations. However, as long as the primary interest has remained 
within the domain of trade and intellectual property rights, the primary le-
gal framework within which multilateral negotiations have taken place have 
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been the treaties and custom instituted by the WTO. The following sections 
aim to provide a background to these negotiations and delve into the crux 
of the debate, thus strengthening the arguments put forth by the developing 
world in its bid to sustain the lives of its most impoverished citizens.
A. The Social Cost of a Stringent Regime of Patent Protection in the 
Developing World
The World Trade Organization Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-erty Rights Agreement (TRIPS), sets out minimum standards for the pres-
ervation of intellectual property rights, including patents for pharmaceuticals. 
It includes within its ambit safeguards to prevent the abuse of protections un-
der a stringent patent regime in the form of relevant flexibilities. In practise, 
however it fails to directly outline the circumstances under which these safe-
guards can be utilized and the procedure for invoking them. The fourth min-
isterial conference, held in 2001 in Doha, Quatar adopted a declaration with 
respect to the public health related aspect of TRIPS. The declaration clarified 
the position of the agreement and empowered countries to take requisite mea-
sures for the protection of public health. This was an important milestone in 
the evolution of the access to public health as it essentially placed the right to 
health above considerations of the protection of individual property.
In addition to the increasing cost of research and development that goes 
into the production of vital medicines, placing them out of the reach of the 
developing world; there has also been a substantial decrease in internation-
al investment in the pharmaceutical industry in developing countries. As 
a result of this, the capacity of developing countries to produce their own 
medicines or even generic substitutions of patented drugs is abysmal. The 
global pharmaceutical market comprises of less than 10 per cent of consum-
ers from developing countries.8 Consequently, drug companies recuperate 
only a minute fraction of their research and development costs from the 
developing world. 
The medicines produced by most pharmaceutical giants remain cures 
for diseases that plague the developed world. Strains of the HIV virus which 
are responsible for a majority of deaths in the African continent or dis-
eases such as Tuberculosis, Dengue, Malaria and the often fatal Human 
African Trypanosomiasis or Sleeping Sickness are still left untouched by 
most pharmaceutical companies. Human African Trypanosomiasis (HAT or 
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sleeping sickness) is a parasitic disease that is transmitted by the tsetse fly, 
and endangers the lives of almost 60 million people in sub-shahran Africa.9 
The countries most affected by the endemic are largely politically unstable 
and lack the requisite healthcare facilities to diagnose and treat the disease, 
thus making its containment a herculean task.10 The treatments currently 
available are outdated and can be used to treat the disease only at specific 
stages. Pentamadine, a drug from 1941 and Suramin date even further back 
to 1921 and are effective in treating only the first stage of the disease.11 They 
have to be injected directly into the blood stream and can be quite expensive 
to administer.12 They do not however, cross the blood brain barrier and are 
ineffective in treating the disease in its advanced stages.13 
Between 1949 and 2009 alternative measures of treatment did devel-
op but they have proven to be just as ineffective in treating the disease.14 
Melarsopol, an arsenic derivative was administered to patients in the second 
stage of their illness. With an almost 50 per cent rate of failure, it killed 
close to five per cent of all patients who receive it.15 Similarly, Eflornithine, 
administered to patients in the 1990s, was relatively well tolerated but was 
difficult to administer without the trained medical personnel and constant 
hospitalization that the countries tethered on the brink of poverty could not 
afford to provide. 16 Nifurtimox-eflornithine combination therapy was added 
to the essential Medicines List of the WHO in May 2009.17 Developed and 
administered by Medecins Sans Frontieres(MSF) in war torn areas it proved 
effective in treating approximately 48,000 cases in across six countries.18 In 
the context of challenging diagnostic specifications, unstable environments 
and the rampant spread of the disease, the MSF has put forth relevant con-
cerns regarding the need for focused research and development into devel-
oping alternative and durable treatments that contain this endemic disease.19
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Another such disease that has attracted the attention of the interna-
tional community due to its rampant spread is malaria. The resurgence of 
Malaria in sub-Sahran Africa has been attributed to the mutation of the par-
asite, making it more drug resistant.20 A Swiss pharmaceutical company de-
veloped the first fixed dose Artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT). 
Observably, due to the exorbitant price of the drug, it  remained inaccessible 
to the poorest regions of the world and was thus ineffective in curbing the 
rampant spread of the disease.21 The United States Government, The World 
Bank and The Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria have undertaken 
significant efforts to aid in the containment of the disease through the Roll 
Back Malaria partnership (RBM) and have attempted to provide infrastruc-
tural guidance to developing countries to help fund the treatment of their 
most vulnerable populations.22 The rising demand for Artemisinin has in-
centivized producers to promote it individually as a form of monotherapy.23
The WHO has condemned this practice as the widespread exposure to 
this drug could in fact accelerate the resistance of this parasite to artemis-
inin.24 Moreover the research into the development of a new anti-malarial 
drug has come to an absolute standstill.25 Public health facilities in Africa 
are still inadequate and fall short of requisite standards of healthcare and 
drug administration.26 As a result of this, people resort to the private sector, 
which has been infiltrated with substandard and artemisinin monothera-
py drugs due to the practically nonexistent post market surveillance of the 
private sector drug industry in low income countries.27 Countries plagued 
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by the endemic still lack structural reforms in their healthcare systems and 
remain largely dependent on donors, a trend that vitiates any attempts to 
institute self regulating, capacity building mechanisms within the region.28
Thus, the research and development involved in the synthesis of drugs 
to cure diseases that affect the poorest countries has effectively come to a 
standstill. This can be attributed to the lack of investment by drug compa-
nies in the markets of developing countries for the fear of not being able to 
recover adequate returns on their investment.29 
B. Deconstructing the Argument of Incentivising Innovation 
Through Rigid Patent Protection in Developing Countries 
Medecins Sans Frontieres(MSF) in consonance with a number of other non-governmental organizations have opposed the argument that an 
increased patent protection would in fact enhance the availability of drugs 
in developing countries.30 They contend that a stronger regime of patent 
protection would only result in an increase in the number of patented drugs, 
the outcome of which would be an increment in the overall cost of health-
care. These drugs will still remain out of reach of most people in devel-
oping countries, thus widening the disparity between the production and 
distribution of effective medication.31 Further, the enforcement of stringent 
measures under the TRIPS will be detrimental to the indigenous production 
capacity as it would hinder the manufacture of generic drugs and irrepara-
bly damage an important industry upon which a majority of the population 
depends for quality, efficient and most importantly, affordable healthcare.32
The impetus to innovation, research and development that is said to 
have been effectuated through a stringent patent regime has remained con-
fined to the private sector of developed countries, from where definitive 
profits are recoverable.33 Consequently, developing countries which have a 
low level of disposable income are often excluded from the ambit of po-
tential research studies as pharmaceutical companies prefer not to invest 
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in the synthesis of drugs that treat life threatening diseases plaguing the 
developing world as the monetary returns from this is minimal.34 Only one 
per cent of the 1400 new medicines created in the last 25 years treat tropical 
diseases such as AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis despite thousands of people 
succumbing to them every year.35 The endorsement of a stringent regime 
of patent protection as a means of incentivizing innovation thus stands on 
feeble foundations; as proved from the preceding empirical data, which sug-
gests that the increase in patent protection measures over the last twenty 
years has not been accompanied by an equivalent increase in the rate of 
drug innovation.36
There exists a two pronged permeation of the obligations imposed by 
the TRIPS into the tenets of Domestic legislation of individual countries. This 
occurs firstly through the regulatory legal processes of trade and economics 
within the construct of which the requisite policy is formulated and secondly, 
within the larger context of the laizzes faire laws of the market, which tend 
to prioritize intellectual property ownership over public interest. Within these 
two interlinked spheres of State regulation and libertarian assumption, is en-
cumbered the standing ethical obligation to protect the rights of individuals 
who may not have the capacity to claim such rights themselves. Thus, a large 
portion of the developing world depends on the ability of their respective 
governments to provide access to these drugs through their state sponsored 
public health systems. These government systems had, up until recently, relied 
almost entirely on the availability of less expensive domestically produced 
generic drugs in their respective markets. Further, they used the presence of 
these drugs in their competitive market spheres as a viable bargaining stand-
point; on the basis of which they negotiated for significant price reductions 
of patented drugs produced by pharmaceutical companies endeavouring to 
break into the slowly emerging developing market.
A number of studies have used models depicting the behaviours of firms 
and consumers to stimulate the loss of welfare through a stringent regime 
of patent protection in developing countries.37 India is a primary example of 
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a low-income developing country which did not recognize patents till 1995 
and in fact led the bloc of countries opposing the TRIPS. The consumer be-
haviour of the Indian market is reflective of the disease profile in numerous 
low income countries across the world.38 The domestic Indian pharmaceuti-
cal industry was the largest producer for domestic drugs in 2002, followed 
by Brazil.39 These markets were initially dominated by multinational subsid-
iaries in the early 1970’s, but soon became self sufficient, with the introduc-
tion of numerous domestic players by 2001.40 The collective share of foreign 
subsidiaries in domestic retail sales in India was 75-90 per cent in 1970; 
which by 2000 had declined to approximately 28-35 per cent.41 
Under the new patent regime, Indian companies engaged in the produc-
tion of drugs, for which patent applications were submitted in the period 
between the signing of the TRIPS agreement in 1995 and its formal recogni-
tion in domestic law on 1st January 2005, can only continue the production 
of these drugs if they pay a royalty to the patent holder.42 As a result of this, 
many of the products manufactured by domestic firms in India or Brazil 
would cease to exist in the market as it would simply no longer be profit-
able for them to continue producing these drugs while paying a royalty to 
the patent holder.43 As a result of the withdrawal of generic drugs from the 
market, consumers will be forced to buy the branded counterparts at sig-
nificantly higher prices. In the absence of domestic competition, the prices 
of products offered by the patent-holders will rise.44 This is especially prob-
lematic in cases of epidemics where potentially life-saving medication would 
not reach the consumers in low income developing countries in time or even 
if they did they would be sold at unaffordable prices, thus being ineffective 
in containing the spread of the disease.45 
Prior to the institution of this regime, drugs were rarely launched by the 
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multinational patent holder and were instead introduced into the market by 
the domestic firms. For example the launch of Ciprofloxacin in India was 
through the domestic firm Ranbaxy, in 1989 instead of Bayer, the interna-
tional patent holder.46 Consequently, when Bayer did enter the market much 
later, it had to lower its prices to compete with the established market share 
commanded by Ranbaxy.47 Multinational companies often delayed their en-
try into the markets of developing countries (where the prices of their prod-
ucts are naturally capped by a much lower disposable income) after hav-
ing negotiated upon higher prices in the markets of developed countries.48 
The foregone profits from this delayed entry were miniscule compared to 
the additional profits they made in the global market of the developed first 
world.49 
The newly instituted patent regime ensures that the patent holder can 
make exorbitant profits in developing markets, in addition to their already 
existing returns from developed markets.50 The trade off for these additional 
profits is however, the suffering of thousands of individuals who belong to 
the poorest countries and simply cannot afford the market price attached to 
their Right to Health; a cost that can no longer be borne by the Governments 
of these countries as well. These additional profits are almost never invested 
in the research and development of effective cures to combat diseases such 
as Malaria and Tuberculosis as the countries in which these diseases are the 
most prevalent do not provide a sufficient profit motive to incentivize pri-
vate sector investment through pharmaceutical conglomerates.51 
As contended previously, there are virtually no profits to be made from 
instituting stringent patents on new drugs or processes that could treat dis-
eases in developing countries, as the majority of the population would not 
be able to afford the patented medication anyway. The loss incurred by 
instituting stringent patents in developing countries is two-fold. It does not 
encourage innovation, development or research to treat diseases in the de-
veloping world and yet places an additional burden on individuals who 
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cannot afford to pay for the exorbitantly priced drugs that aid in battling 
life threatening diseases. 
The WHO Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public 
Health (CIPIH) in April 2006 confirmed that “in a market that has limited 
purchasing power, patents are not a relevant factor, in stimulating research 
and development or bringing new innovations into the market”52 Thus the 
development of effective public healthcare is thus dependent on the common 
but differentiated range of purchasing power of individuals, determined by 
whether they belong to low income developing countries or profit making 
developed countries.53 This is evident from the table below54 which makes a 
comparison of the share of the therapeutic segments in retail sales in a devel-
oping country, in this case India, with that of the world market. This proves 
that the disease most prevalent in a developing country does not attract the 
highest sales in the global market and therefore pharmaceutical companies 
would much rather focus their research on improving drugs that command 
the highest sales in the global market made up of mostly developed coun-
tries as opposed to synthesizing drugs that are most needed in developing 
countries.55
Table 1 represents a comparison of the expenditure on public healthcare 
in developing and developed countries.56 It indicates a much lesser portion 
of the GDP being apportioned to healthcare expenditure in low income 
developing countries than in developed countries. This indicates that the 
capacity of the government to improve upon its healthcare infrastructure, 
accessibility and support to the lowest income groups is directly related to 
average per capita income and consequent purchasing power of individuals 
within that country. The greater the per capita income of the country, the 
more the government invests in providing healthcare to its citizens. In low 
income developing countries, the burden of healthcare costs is largely borne 
by citizens. Thus, a stringent regime of patents would in fact only increase 
this burden without providing tangible benefits in terms of new and effective 
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cures, as concluded from the previously established trend of pharmaceutical 
companies ignoring developing countries in terms of research for new drugs. 
Table 1
This argument is strengthened by the data provided in the second part of 
Table 2 which collates the leading causes of the burden of disease in a developing 
country, in this case, India and compares it with that in the United States. The 
vastly differing figures prove that the healthcare needs of the developed world 
are vastly different from those of the developing world. An intuitive conclusion 
to this would be that pharmaceutical companies tend to invest their resources 
in the development of drugs for which they would get the highest returns as 
the prices of their drugs sold in the developed markets would not be capped by 
the limited purchasing power of individuals.57 As a result of this they would be 
able to recover their costs of production more efficiently if they focused their 
research and innovation on developing cures for diseases that plague the devel-
oped world as opposed to those that plague the developing world; the market 
strength of which would depend on the affordability of drugs produced.58
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Table 2
The pharmaceutical industry thus recuperates its costs and meets its profit 
making goals from developed markets and does not require developing mar-
kets to sustain itself. This has been further analysed in the following section
The Real Cost of Innovation – The Recovery of Production Costs 
Primarily From Developed Markets
Patents confer onto producers exclusive rights to the market in order for them to recover the costs that they might have incurred during the 
research and development of a particular product. The knowledge, using 
which the particular product was made, can be used only by someone who 
is authorized to do so by the patent holder. This protection of patents is 
afforded by society on to the holders of patents on the premise that without 
this guarantee of market exclusivity there would be no incentive to inno-
vation. Thus, the State runs on an assumption that a stringent regime of 
patents would pay off in the long run as a result of the development of new 
prototypes that stimulate technical efficiency and effectuate scientific prog-
ress. However this assumption ignores the higher costs incurred through the 
creation of a monopoly that excludes competition and effectively paves the 
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path for arbitrary pricing in the long run, thus taking advantage of the des-
perate need and continuous demand of these life saving drugs. The rationale 
for a stringent patent regime is thus based on sweeping assumptions that 
may not actually take effect in reality, especially in the context of developing 
countries.59
The pharmaceutical industry deems patent protection to be an extreme-
ly important aspect of recuperating Research and development costs and 
technological innovation.60 They claim that approximately $800 million is 
spent on the production of a single drug. Further, flexibilities such as com-
pulsory licensing and parallel imports threaten the viability of the medical 
innovation system. Evidence suggests that these figures do not reflect actual 
costs but the opportunity costs of what the money could have earned if it 
was spent elsewhere.61 The pharmaceutical industry is largely based in the 
United States and Europe. In the U.S, extensive tax reductions are afforded 
to companies engaged in research and development. This recuperates close 
to 50 per cent of the cost incurred in the production of new drugs.62 Further, 
a number of clinical trials as well as research studies are carried out in gov-
ernment funded laboratories, which are maintained using taxpayer money. 
Thus, the public funds the research and development of the essential med-
ication that they are often denied access to. The pharmaceutical industry 
spends 75 per cent less than what it claims to have spent on the manufacture 
of these drugs.63 
The profits made on patented medication in developing countries do 
not stimulate research and innovation toward developing possible cures for 
the majority of diseases in these developing countries. An estimated 90 per 
cent of global health research and development is spent on diseases that af-
fect only 10 per cent of the world’s population.64 In 2005, Africa accounted 
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for approximately one per cent of the global market for pharmaceuticals.65 
A recent study showed that between 1975 and 1999, only 0.1 per cent of 
drugs produced were for tropical diseases.66 
Further, the fear that the re-importation of generic varieties of patented 
drugs, under compulsory licensing or upon the exhaustion of a domestic 
patent, might be detrimental to the established market in developed coun-
tries is largely speculative. Considering the fact that, products from generic 
industries in India and Thailand have not flooded developed markets earlier, 
the likelihood of them doing so post the TRIPS agreement is minimal. More-
over, the strengthening of already established institutional safeguards to 
prevent this re-importation of generic drugs into developed markets would 
significantly negate the possibility of this ever happening. The unfounded 
threat of this possibly accruing in the future and affecting the profits of 
pharmaceutical companies in developed markets cannot however be used as 
a valid justification for preventing millions of individuals across the world 
from accessing their basic right to health. 
The WHO Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public 
Health (CIPIH) report made a number of valid recommendations to im-
prove the system of intellectual property regulation in order to increase the 
accessibility of individuals within developing countries to essential medi-
cines. To this effect, the commission encouraged governments, especially 
those of developing countries, to invoke the flexibilities within the TRIPS 
Agreement and use them to institute a regime wherein less stringent protec-
tions are afforded to patents within their domestic jurisdictions. This would 
deter pharmaceutical companies from filing patents in low income devel-
oping countries as the returns from such a patent would be minimal within 
the construct of a less stringent regime of patent protection.67 There is an 
outstanding requirement for the international political acceptance of the 
creation of a global framework of research and development so that the cost 
and benefits of essential medicines can be equitably distributed. This would 
instigate the process of effective capacity building in developing countries. 
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3. FUNDAMENTAL SHORTCOMINGS IN  
EXISTING EFFORTS TO CREATE AN INCLUSIVE  
SYSTEM OF HEALTHCARE
The Adoption of the TRIPS Agreement in 1994 fundamentally changed the legal environment for the production and supply of medicines.68 
Subsequent to the universally applicable trade regulations promulgated by 
the Treaty, the members of the WTO adopted the Doha Declaration, nota-
bly the first international effort to clarify the presence and applicability of 
the flexible norms laid out under the TRIPS. The 140 Trade Ministers of 
countries ranging from the United States to Switzerland were in agreement 
that the TRIPS “does not and should not prevent members from taking 
measures to protect public health ... and that the agreement can and should 
be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ 
rights to protect public health and specifically promote the access to medi-
cines for all.”69 
The Declaration did however acknowledge that many countries have 
“insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector” 
and thus could in no way be able to capitalize on the provision that allowed 
for compulsory licensing70 within the TRIPS. The Declaration thus failed to 
expand its ambit to take into account the needs and vulnerabilities of the 
least developed countries. 
In late August 2003, the members of the TRIPS council addressed the 
issue of capacity building in the pre-Cancun Agreement. It allowed for the 
export of drugs produced under compulsory licensing, but only on the ful-
filment of certain predetermined criteria.  In order to avail of the benefits 
of the import of drugs produced under compulsory licences, a country must 
show that it lacks the requisite capacity to produce medicines on its own, 
even those under a compulsory license from the original patent holder. Fur-
ther, there also exists a need to prove the existence of a health emergency 
within the country, which makes it imperative to import drugs produced 
under compulsory licenses as opposed to original patented ones. This provi-
sion has been criticized for obstructing the implementation of mechanisms 
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to better the system of healthcare in developing nations by placing an unnec-
essary reliance on often subjective and unascertainable criteria.71 
The pharmaceutical industry contends that the export of medicines un-
der a compulsory license would be a violation of obligations under Article 
1709(10) of the NAFTA,72 as was seen in the case of the strong opposition 
to Canada’s proposal of export of drugs manufactured to cure tuberculosis, 
HIV and Malaria.73 This is exactly the kind of restriction that saw vehement 
opposition from developing countries in the pre Cancun Agreement.74 The 
creation of a functioning capacity in order to allow the universal actualiza-
tion of the Right to Health has often been restricted by the crystallization of 
legal principles that preclude even the most progressive governments from 
taking active measures; for the fear of relegating their citizens to the receiv-
ing end of harsh trade sanctions imposed by more powerful nations. The 
principle of pacta sunda servant has thus been used to spur the notion of the 
prioritization of individual enterprise over the Right to Health.75
4. THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO  
AFFORDABLE HEALTHCARE
In 2001, the High Commissioner for Human Rights called upon States to embody the provisions of the TRIPS within their domestic legislation in 
a manner that maintained the balance between the rights of the innovators 
and the interest of the public as reflected in Article 15 of the treaty, which 
endorses the flexible application of obligations under the TRIPS. Thus, the 
recognition of the importance of innovation and the rewards for such inno-
vation comes with the caveat that States may be allowed or rather expected 
to utilize the flexibilities available within the TRIPS to aid in the realiza-
tion of their goals of universal public health. The special rapporteur noted 
that “in accordance with intellectual property treaties, States must establish 
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‘minimum standards of protection,’... surpassing these standards, although 
profitable in the short term would not however always be compatible with 
human rights obligations”.76
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights mandates the embodiment 
of the right to health within the domestic legislation of Nations. The In-
ternational Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
makes the right to health binding on all parties to the treaty. Further, Article 
12 of the treaty stipulates “The right of individuals to the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health”. Within the context of the obliga-
tions set forth in these treaties it is imperative for activists to strategize a du-
rable way forward to effectuate the crystallization of norms that surround 
the Right to Health, Life and Bodily integrity; thus making these universally 
obligatory standards even for countries not party to the specific treaties.
General Comment 14 of the CESCR states that the dispensing of es-
sential drugs, as defined by the WHO Action Program on essential drugs 
is a “core obligation” of the State under the ICESCR. The Human Rights 
Council has recently confirmed that the Right to Health includes access to 
medicines, in a general sense and is not restricted to medicines on the WHO 
essential medicines list.77 Effective healthcare, has through the due course 
of international deliberation, been recognized as a fundamental right that 
has its origins in the natural law conception of an all encompassing right to 
life. This right is not provided by the State but can only be regulated by it 
through a procedure established by law; one that satisfies the requirements 
of justice, fairness and equity. The Right to Intellectual Property is not a fun-
damental right but merely a legal entitlement, granted in order to effectuate 
economic progress. The protection of this entitlement although justifiable to 
a certain extent does not merit the denial of capacity building instruments 
such as the production and importation of essential drugs and vaccinations, 
which may be essential to the very sustenance of life.
The prioritization of Intellectual Property Rights, an individual eco-
nomic interest above the right to health is thus inherently problematic as it 
monetizes a fundamental right, restricting its enjoyment only to a privileged 
few, capable of affording it. This essentially opens the floodgates to an ex-
tremely dangerous situation where the right to life can be bought and sold 
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thereby reducing its stature to a mere commodity rather than an intrinsic 
value, indispensable to the very tenets that define our humanity.
It is thus the prerogative of the governments of Nations to balance the 
right to Intellectual Property with larger considerations of the preservation 
of human life. The core obligation of a State is not to incentivize creativ-
ity or innovation but to ensure basic necessities such as food, health and 
education. Additionally, the private interests of individual entrepreneurs 
should be balanced with the larger social benefits that can be accrued out 
of such innovation. The end goal of social progress is not the enrichment of 
a few but the betterment of the majority. “Ultimately, intellectual property 
is a social product that has a social function. State governments, thus have 
a standing duty to prevent unreasonably high costs for access to essential 
medicines.”78 
A. Discovering Flexibilities within the TRIPS, which Facilitate 
Access to Affordable Healthcare
The Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act No 90. of 1997 (Amendment Act) was introduced by Nelson Mandela to cre-
ate a provision for increasing the availability of and access to affordable 
medicines in South Africa. It endorsed the generic substitution of off patent-
ed medicines, transparent pricing of all medicines and the parallel importa-
tion of patented medicines. 79 This was based on a draft text produced by 
the WIPO Committee of Experts.80
This legislation was vehemently opposed by major pharmaceutical 
companies, backed largely by the governments of the developed world. The 
Government of the United States espoused the cause of these pharmaceuti-
cal companies and threatened to levy trade sanctions against South Africa. 
81Similar Action was taken by the European Union as well.82 This resulted in 
protests and demonstrations by AIDS activists all over the world. The nega-
tive attention drawn by the trial towards the major pharmaceutical compa-
nies left a huge impact on their profit margins, eventually resulting in a with-
drawal of the case. This case for the first time paved the way for developing 
countries to take a firm stance against their more developed counterparts 
without facing the repercussions of the same in the form of trade sanctions.
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The United States government, post its stance against the South African 
legislation that sought to increase accessibility, came under severe attack for 
its lack of commitment towards Human Rights concerns.  As a result of this 
the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle was used by President Clinton 
to announce a revised policy wherein the Trade Representative and the De-
partment of Health and Human Services would look into the health related 
aspects of the United States trade-related intellectual property law.83  In May 
2000, the US issued an executive order to facilitate the access to HIV/AIDS 
drugs and related medical technology, through the use of compulsory licenc-
es in sub-Saharan Africa.84
Similarly, the Brazilian AIDS program reduced AIDS-related mortalities 
by about 50 per cent between 1996 and 1999.85 Brazil used the threat of 
compulsory licensing as a bargaining chip in its negotiation with major phar-
maceutical companies in order to facilitate the reduction of prices of essential 
drugs. Article 68 under the patent law of Brazil allows a patent to be used 
without the consent of the patent holder.86 This model of compulsory licens-
ing has served as an important instrument of empowerment for other devel-
oping countries, which may have had the capacity to produce these drugs but 
lack resources to fund the research and development required for the produc-
tion of completely new prototypes. Brazil has offered multiple cooperation 
agreements to aid in the transfer of technology to developing countries for 
the production of generic varieties of patented drugs.87 The United States no-
tably, still maintains its stance that Article 68, allowing compulsory licensing 
is contradictory to article 27.1 and 28.1 of the TRIPS.88 
Although the provision for compulsory licensing may have differed from 
the black letter of the law it was still very much in keeping with the spirit of 
the TRIPS agreement. Article 5.4 of the Paris Convention,89 upon which the 
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TRIPS agreement is largely based, allows for compulsory licensing in certain 
cases. This has been embodied within Article 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Under Article 31 of the TRIPS the original patent holder receives adequate 
remuneration under compulsory licences as well. Further, essential drugs 
produced under compulsory licenses can be exported to countries which 
have minimal or no production capacity.90 The exporting of the drugs pro-
duced under compulsory licensing is imperative as it would not only aid in 
the dissemination of these drugs within the poorest countries but the money 
saved by the government through the utilization of these drugs as opposed 
to original patented varieties could be invested in developing the production 
capacities of these countries as well, thus making them more self reliant. 
This is a better system than continued dependence on foreign aid as it allows 
for the poorest countries to create for themselves a system of self sustenance 
and in doing so negotiate with developed countries on a close to equal foot-
ing. Thus compulsory licensing can be an effective tool to overcome barriers 
such as prohibitive pricing that is largely caused by patent abuse.
The Doha declaration, although instrumental as a compulsory license to 
endorse a regime of flexibilities within TRIPS towards humanitarian ends, 
did not clarify the stance regarding the export of drugs produced under 
compulsory licensing. Article 31 (f) of the TRIPS limits drugs produced un-
der compulsory licensing predominantly to supply in the domestic market. 
It is imperative that further international action permit the export of drugs 
produced under compulsory licensing to countries that do not possess the 
capacity to produce these drugs even after a compulsory license for the same 
has been obtained.  An alliance of NGOs including the Consumer Project on 
Technology, Essential Action, Medicins Sans Frontieres, Oxfam Internation-
al, Health GAP Coalition and The Third World Network called upon the 
WTO members to incorporate a solution to the issue of export of drugs un-
der compulsory licences. They proposed that under Article 30 of the TRIPS, 
members may provide an exception to the exclusive rights con-
ferred by a particular patent to permit all acts associated with the 
production for export to a third country of a patented product or a 
product produced by a patented process; where the export address-
es the health needs in the third country; and the product and/or the 
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process is either (a) not patented; or (b) a compulsory license has 
been granted or the government has made use of relevant patents 
in the third country.91 
This solution is both economically viable as well as relatively simple in 
terms of administration.
B. The Judicial Endorsement of Affordable  Healthcare  
Over Arguments of Economic Sustainability
This part of the analysis focuses on the factors that have shaped the debate on the TRIPS and the right to health through various judicial 
decisions. These decisions of courts across the world have sought to pave 
a way forward for the international community to reconcile two opposing 
factions of human development. 
The crux of the debate lies on two levels of argumentation. Firstly, 
would the reformation of intellectual property laws be more effective in 
improving accessibility, rather than alternative methods such as price con-
trols and financial aid? And secondly, in light of incentivizing innovation 
through research and development, would a stringent intellectual property 
regime aid in effectuating the universal enjoyment of the right to health in 
developing countries?
The first judicial decision that challenged the existing norm of intellec-
tual property protection was a 2002 decision of the Thai Central Intellectual 
Property and Trade Court.92 The court, in this case, drew a fundamental 
distinction between medicines and other products, as the drugs in question 
were fundamental to the sustenance of the life of a human being. This dis-
tinction placed medicines above other forms of property and dissolved the 
solitary claim of an individual institution to make way for a nuanced struc-
ture of rights and obligations, one that must be regulated by the State. The 
court laid down an important precedent in establishing the supremacy of 
the Right to Health. Further, it made use of Humanitarian considerations to 
expose the flexibilities within the TRIPS agreement. This was in consonance 
with the defined objective and construct of the Doha Agreement. 
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Similarly, a 2008 Delhi High Court decision concurred with the previ-
ously established trend of the affording an exceptional status to life saving 
drug, hence differentiating them from the pre-mandated rule.93 The Court 
concluded that in the case of essential medicines, the pay offs for the strin-
gent protection of patents were largely unknown variables as there was no 
definitive guarantee of investment, research or development in exchange for 
the same. However, this regime of stringent protection of patented medica-
tion placed an obligation on the State to protect individual enterprise at all 
costs, the fallout of which included “the likelihood of injury to non parties” 
and “the risk of denial of remedies”.94 Thus, it held that “the granting of an 
injunction to stop the production of a generic variety of  a life saving drug 
would be a prima facie violation of the right to life and liberty, enshrined 
within Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.”95 Similarly, the South African 
Court of Appeals laid down an important test in the determination of a 
grant of injunction on the production of generic variety of a patented drug. 
It held that it was imperative that the “broader public interest” be taken, 
in light of a “balance of convenience” in assessing whether a preliminary 
injunction should be issued.96
A 2004 decision of a Peruvian Constitutional court upheld the Right to 
Health as protected under Article 7 and 9 of the Peruvian Constitution.97 
The Court adjudicated upon the right of HIV/AIDS patients to free antiret-
roviral treatment. It used the provisions of the Doha Declaration to cir-
cumvent the stringency of the TRIPS Agreement holding that “the concerns 
regarding the effect of intellectual property rights on medicines cannot be 
left to one side.”98 
The TRIPS Agreement does not aim to obstruct the duty of the member 
countries to provide for the health requirements of its citizens. It is imper-
ative that the right to health be construed in the most basic sense as an 
access to available medication for the enjoyment of a sustained reasonable 
standard of life. Yet it is obligatory upon the courts of countries not com-
pletely diverge from the provisions of the TRIPS and the subsequent Doha 
Declaration, which aimed to create a modicum of flexibility in the interpre-
tation and application of the provisions of the TRIPS. It is in this context 
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that a need for clarity arises as to the nature and extent of this flexibility and 
whether it is enough to sustain a universal right to health while at the same 
time encourage research and development and protect innovation.
A 2009 decision of the Kenyan court held that the Anti Counterfeiting 
Act must be overturned on the grounds that it defined ‘counterfeit’ to include 
a patent anywhere in the world, thus making generic medicines unavailable 
in Kenya.99 This restrictive definition effectively limited the access to essential 
medicines, threatening the lives of the petitioners and others infected with 
the HIV virus. This case brought forth an unprecedented instance of the 
judiciary stepping in to correct a possible oversight by the legislature and 
retaining the stance of the developing world of prioritizing the right to health 
over the protection of intellectual property.100  A Chilean court reiterated this 
stance in 2013 holding that a law that allows the pricing of a drug so as to 
place it out of the reach of the majority of the country’s citizens, effectively 
violates the right to health, as guaranteed by the Chilean Constitution.101
A case that drew sufficient attention to the needs based stance of devel-
oping countries was Novartis v. Monte Verde102 wherein it was argued by 
the plaintiffs that they must be granted exclusivity of data in accordance 
with the obligations laid out under the TRIPS.  The Argentinian Court held 
that the objective of reverse engineering was to fulfil the obligation of the 
State to address the public health demands of an increasingly incapacitat-
ed, ailing population. Further the right to health was inextricably linked to 
the right to life which forms the basis of the Constitutional guarantee of a 
government.103 The court thus used international human rights obligations 
to lobby for a less stringent regime of Intellectual property protection, espe-
cially when it put an individual economic right on a balancing scale with the 
inherent right to life of all human beings.
The outcomes of these decisions, although not binding outside their 
respective domestic jurisdictions have been instrumental in setting a trend 
of legal precedent that international courts can draw upon. They form the 
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basis of articulate argumentation in a relatively nascent area of law, one 
that aims to use the tenets of humanitarian ideals to restrict the pragmatic 
application of economic regulation. Such a precedent is often instrumental 
in affording a sense of legitimacy to executive and legislative action of a 
similar nature. For example, the compulsory license on the HIV medication 
Efavirenz, instituted by the Brazilian government was recognized interna-
tionally as an actualization of State responsibility to “protect and preserve 
the human right to health.”104 The formulation of this norm of Intellectual 
property preservation within the construct of Humanitarian considerations, 
by courts, has had a massive trickledown effect in civil society as well. The 
judicial decisions propounded within these cases have in a sense legitimized 
the institution of public welfare policies that seek to prioritize public inter-
est over the profit driven demands of pharmaceutical companies. They also 
provide a strong foundation within the framework of which non-govern-
mental organizations and rights based groups can pressurize pharmaceu-
tical companies to afford due consideration to the healthcare needs of the 
developing world.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE REFORMATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
AND POLICY
Embodied within the covenants of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is “the Right of an individual to enjoy the protection of moral 
and material interests that result from scientific, literary or artistic produc-
tion of which he is the author”.105 Notably, there is a standing obligation 
upon governments of nation states to balance this with the “right to share 
in scientific advancement and its benefits”.106
There is emerging consensus on establishing that developing countries 
cannot, in the given economic status quo, expect adequate investment in 
research and innovation towards cures for diseases that largely plague their 
populations. This is because it would simply be economically detrimental 
for large pharmaceutical companies to shift their production from drugs 
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that cure diseases prevalent in developed countries towards the needs of de-
veloping countries. The furtherance of humanitarian goals such as the right 
to health requires human rights law to be used as a lens through which one 
might interpret and formulate the application of patent law. In the present 
context, a strong patent regime in developing countries can only increase 
prices of essential medicines without guaranteeing innovation, and therefore 
must be reformed.
A. Reforming Intellectual Property Policy at a Domestic Level
At the crux of the issue lies the reconciliation of two broadly opposing consequences of human enterprise. At one end of the spectrum is the 
encouragement of innovation, research and development through the pro-
tection of novel ideas. At the other end, lies the obligation of the State to 
make socially beneficial novelties accessible to the majority of individuals. 
While the recognition of individual liberty is imperative to the sustained 
progress and cultural development of a nation, it cannot be the sole deter-
minant of a policy that affects millions of individuals. It is in this regard that 
there emerges a need for the reformation of intellectual property law and 
policy to incorporate the needs of the most vulnerable, especially with re-
gards to essential medicines; while at the same time endeavouring to achieve 
a minimum standard of protection of research and a reward based incentive 
for innovation. 
i. The Benefits of Establishing a Less Stringent Regime of Patent 
Protection within Developing Countries
Intellectual property policy, more often than not, is determined as a result of the exertion of power that profitable conglomerates have over the gov-
ernments of countries. Thus, the consideration of public good is completely 
overshadowed by commercial interests. This imbalance often transcends do-
mestic policy formulation and permeates into international deliberations be-
tween developing and developed countries. A stringent regime of intellectual 
property protection is largely beneficial to the export markets of developed 
countries. Consumer nations however, in this case mostly developing coun-
tries, do not have enough bargaining power to stand up to and negotiate 
with these developed countries on close to an equal footing. 
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The strengthening of IP laws without providing for reasonable flexibil-
ities would effectively restrict the diffusion of socially beneficial knowledge 
in the developing world, thus incapacitating large populations and denying 
them the opportunity not only to access essential medicines presently but 
also sustain themselves in the future. Reverse engineering and production 
of generic stereotypes have been longstanding methods of this diffusion of 
knowledge. However, clamping down on these processes hinder the capacity 
building processes of developing countries.
The reason behind developing countries accepting the TRIPS agreement 
was the promise of a reduction in the protectionist policies of international 
trade. Observably, developed countries have wavered on their promises to 
liberalize their markets to allow for imports on agricultural produce and 
textiles. Developing countries have had to accept the restrictive provisions 
of the TRIPS that often prevent their access to essential commodities such 
as life saving medicines. The international community has recognized this 
disparity at the Doha and Monterrey conferences where the governments 
welcomed the “integration of development objectives into the formulation 
of IP rules and practice, including the need for the WTO to recognize the 
needs of developing countries and include them in the basic structure of its 
working program.”108 
The latest World Bank report estimates that most developed countries 
would benefit from the TRIPS as a result of the enhanced value of their 
patents. This benefit is estimated at an annual amount of 19 billion dollars 
in the United States alone. Developing countries would be the net losers 
with, for example, South Korea incurring losses amounting to 15 billion 
dollars.109
The strength of a patent protection can be determined from the scope 
of the patent and the length of the period for which it was granted. Often 
the patent extends beyond the basic structure of the invention itself. Extend-
ing a patent beyond the scope for which such patent was claimed is in fact 
detrimental to innovation as it allows the patent holder to own the rights 
over all aspects of a particular knowledge or process, whose alternative use 
107 ibid.
108 World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health (WT/MIN (01)/DEC/2  November 14, 2001).
109 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 2002: Making 
Trade Work for the World’s Poor (ISBN 0-8213-996-1 1 January 2002)143. <http://sit-
eresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP/Resources /335315-1257200370513/gep2002com-
plete.pdf> accessed May 10, 2014.
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or application may have been discovered by someone else. This acts as a 
disincentive to research and analysis into alternative uses or applications 
of patented knowledge or processes, thus limiting the depth of scientific 
study. Thus, narrower patents would allow researchers and innovators to 
work around existing patents even under a stringent regime. This policy of 
granting narrower patents also provides an impetus to the production of 
generic drugs at cheaper costs that work around existing patents and are less 
vulnerable to challenge in courts.110 
An underlying assumption that is used to justify a strong patent re-
gime is that there exists a latent potential of innovtive capacity that would 
be unleashed through stringent patent protection. However in developing 
countries there is a definite need to build this capacity. This can be done 
through government investment in research, development and education. 
The government would have the resources to invest in this research and 
development only if it is able to save on costs incurred in obtaining essential 
drugs, required to ensure that the basic health needs of the majority of its 
citizens are met. Thus, a less stringent patent regime would in fact allow 
developing countries to invest in research and development and build upon 
this latent potential of innovative capacity. This potential could eventually 
be actualized though the development self sustaining health systems, there-
by reducing the dependency of the developing world on foreign aid. 
ii. Using Flexibilities within the TRIPS to Create Self Sustaining 
Mechanisms for Healthcare in the Developing World
Article 7 sets forth the primary objectives of the TRIPS Agreement. It essentially provides that the right to intellectual property is merely a 
means to an end and not an end in itself. It must thus contribute to the 
mutual advantage of innovators and the general public “in a manner that 
is conducive to social and economic welfare, and to institute a balance of 
rights and obligations.” Article 8 provides the requirement for the formula-
tion of laws that “protect public health and nutrition”. Notably, the article 
also mandates that these laws be in consonance with the specific provisions 
of the TRIPS. Article 73 allows action in contravention of the TRIPS but 
in limited circumstances such as during war, emergencies or in furtherance 
of peace and security. Article 30 permits member States to provide certain 
110 J.Sachs, ‘The Global Innovation Divide’, in A. Jaffe, A. Lerner, J. and S. Stern (eds.), In-
novation Policy and the Economy, vol 3 (1st edn, MIT Press 2003) <http://www.nber.org/
books/innovation3/> accessed May 4, 2014.
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exceptions to the rights conferred by patents. Observably, these exceptions 
have been interpreted differently by the governments of different countries, 
thus rendering the effectuation of an equitable regime of patent protection, 
all the more difficult. The following sections expound upon the utilization 
of these flexibilities to develop processes and policies which provide the citi-
zens of the developing world, a greater access to essential medicines.
A. Parallel Imports
Parallel Imports are a system of cross border trade in a product that is still under a patent without taking the permission of the patent holder. 
This occurs when there is a significant difference in pricing for the same 
good, in different markets.111 Developing countries should not be made to 
restrict cheaper imports from developed or other developing countries. To 
this effect, in order to comply with the regulatory provisions of the TRIPS, 
developing countries should allow parallel imports only when the patent 
holders’ rights have been exhausted in the country from which the commod-
ity is being imported. 
The provisions of the TRIPS, although obligatory in nature can still be 
superseded by the exercise of the sovereign authority of independent States 
to formulate their own trade related laws. The Agreement thus allows coun-
tries to develop their own laws that establish the subsisting time period of a 
patent. According to article 6 of the TRIPS the “first sale doctrine” cannot 
be made subject to WTO dispute settlement. Thus developing countries can 
capitalize on the benefits of parallel imports through the embodiment of a 
regime of “international exhaustion”. Under such a regime a patent owner 
loses his right over the patent once it has been put on the domestic market 
of any country. This allows other countries to import the patented product 
if it has been put on any such domestic market, anywhere in the world, thus 
making off patent products available at cheaper prices.
B. Compulsory Licensing
The TRIPS Agreement allows its members to use patented inventions without the authorization of the patent owner, either by the govern-
ment or through the issuing of compulsory licenses. The grounds on which 
compulsory licenses may be granted are not restricted by the TRIPS except 
in the areas of non working or dependent patents. As long as certain proce-
111 Roussel Uclaf v. Hockley International, [1996] R.P.C. 441.
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dural conditions are followed compulsory licenses may be allowed on multi-
ple grounds including public health, national interest and food security. The 
conditions required for the use of compulsory licenses are prescribed within 
Article 31 of the TRIPS. Article 5 of the Paris Convention confers onto 
nations the right to take legislative measures to grant compulsory licenses.
Compulsory licensing is an extremely effective instrument through 
which developing countries can make essential patented medication more 
accessible to its citizens. It is thus imperative that developing nations estab-
lish a strong framework of laws and procedures as well as the infrastruc-
tural facilities required to give effect to compulsory licenses. According to 
article 31(f) of the TRIPS a compulsory license must be “predominantly for 
use in the domestic market”. This is problematic as there are a number of 
countries which have no manufacturing capacity and cannot issue a com-
pulsory license to a foreign manufacturer due to the territorial nature of 
patents. An amendment to this provision, so as to exclude laws, policies or 
administrative regulations in the furtherance of public health from its ambit; 
would be instrumental in the removal of trade related barriers to the actual-
ization of the right to health in developing nations. 
Another effective instrument of introducing generic drugs into the do-
mestic market without incurring significant economic losses is the “Bolar 
exception”. The U.S Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act, 1984, in overturning the landmark court decision of Roche v. Bo-
lar,112 introduced the concept of an early working exception. This exception 
makes it legal for a generic producer to import, manufacture and test a 
patented product before the expiry of its patent. This is done to ensure that 
the subsequent generic variation of the patented drug complies with the 
requirements mandated by specific domestic legislation, thus ensuring its 
quality and efficacy. 
The flexibilities afforded by the TRIPS should be utilized by developing 
countries in the most effective manner possible. It is imperative that the gov-
ernments of developing countries find an appropriate middle ground and 
utilize the strongholds and loopholes within International agreements to 
their benefit. It is also essential that they endorse Internationally recognized 
norms of patent protection norms which are reflective of a policy of Intel-
lectual property protection that incentivizes originality without excluding 
certain sections of society from reaping its benefits. 
112 Roche v. Bolar, 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir., 1984).
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B. Recommendations to Improve Institutional Collaboration in 
Achieving Universal Accessibility to Essential Medicines
The WIPO, due to its existing working relationship with domestic patent offices of governments all over the world, would be able to formulate 
a comprehensive guide of existing patents on essential medicines. Although 
the final interpretation of the flexibilities within the TRIPS agreement lies 
largely with the WTO, the WIPO can play a pivotal role in reconstructing 
existing perceptions with regard to the flexibilities within the TRIPS agree-
ment and its facilitation of a greater access to essential medicines in devel-
oping countries. The WIPO should clarify the existing flexibilities within the 
TRIPS agreement and recommend their incorporation into the legislations of 
developing countries.
An example of this would be to advise developing countries against 
entering into TRIPS Plus trade agreements with developed nations. There 
is an increasing and yet alarming trend of governments in developing coun-
tries being pressurized by the pharmaceutical industry to implement patent 
legislation that extends beyond basic requirements of the TRIPS agreement. 
Also referred to as TRIPS Plus, this refers to the efforts on the part of devel-
oped countries to lobby for an extended patent protection on certain drugs; 
beyond the twenty year period. Further, it calls for the strengthening of 
existing patents, thereby rendering the flexibility afforded by the TRIPS to 
governments to reduce the stringency in the application of patent protection 
laws and allow for the permeation of generic variations into the market, 
virtually redundant. These agreements although seemingly economically 
profitable remain hugely detrimental to a large percentage of the vulnerable 
population living in these developing countries.
A number of State sponsored or international programs such as the 
UNAIDS Drugs Access Initiative have been instrumental in inducing price 
reductions and attracting investment to better the healthcare infrastructure 
in developing or underdeveloped countries. This prevents the percolation of 
essential drugs into the black market and the production of often dangerous 
counterfeit drugs. Further, these programs assist in the training of healthcare 
personnel to create an efficient system of dissemination of essential drugs to 
the poorest and most inaccessible regions.
The European Commission has noted that “the experience with vaccines 
and contraceptives have allayed fears of impracticality of differential pric-
ing between developed and developing countries”.113 The Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America in explaining its rationale behind 
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differential pricing has stated that different prices for pharmaceuticals make 
them available to consumers at prices lower than what would be possible 
if only a uniform system of pricing was made applicable. The difference in 
pricing across markets (i.e lower prices in developing countries and higher 
prices in developed countries) based on the purchasing power of the target 
demographic in each country, can in fact increase overall sales, maximize 
the overall output and serve markets more efficiently. This benefits devel-
oping countries by increasing the availability of reasonably priced products 
and as well as developed countries by lowering prices than what they might 
have been under a uniform price regime, through the economies of scale.114 
The WIPO should collaborate with the WHO in order to establish a 
joint initiative within the construct of which experts in healthcare as well 
as intellectual property can develop a basic framework of research. On 
such foundations the international policies could aid in the universal access 
to essential medication can be formulated. Lastly, it is imperative that the 
WIPO facilitates international engagement, deliberation, and coordination 
between intergovernmental as well as non-governmental organizations in 
order to accelerate the process of the actualization of the right to health in 
the developing world. 
6. CONCLUSION
The end objective of both international as well as domestic develop-mental policy is to facilitate economic advancement, accelerated social 
progress and infrastructural expansion in order to achieve the basic goals 
of development. One such goal is affording access to primary healthcare to 
the most vulnerable individuals, who do not have the requisite means and 
resources to claim the rights that they are entitled to themselves. The eco-
nomic indicators of development attribute the progress within a country to 
technological prowess and scientific innovation. In keeping with this theory, 
a stringent regime of intellectual property protection confers the right to 
market exclusivity onto individual entities; with a view to incentivize inno-
vation and effectuate development in the long run. Similarly, the promise 
of focused investment to facilitate research initiatives is used to justify an 
113 Martin Foreman, ‘Beyond Our Means?: The Cost of Treating HIV/AIDS in the Develop-
ing World,’ (The Panos Institute, London, 2000) 13 < www.panos.org.uk> accessed May 
10, 2014.
114 R. Howse, ‘Conference: Linking Trade and Sustainable Development: Roundtable Dis-
cussion,’ (2003) 18 American University International Law Review 1324.
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exclusionary price regime of essential medicines in developing countries as 
well. However, the assumption that the institution of stringent patent laws, 
especially in developing countries, will encourage  foreign investment and 
aid in the creation of self sustaining healthcare mechanisms, is an inherently 
flawed leap of faith; one that has been disproved through the course of this 
paper. 
The sustenance of human life is a primary duty of the State, as pro-
pounded in the most basic conceptions of the social contract theory of State 
formation. Numerous international agreements, institutional resolutions 
and domestic judicial interventions have paved a way forward for the rec-
onciliation of the two conflicting realms of economic regulation and the ful-
filment of State obligations. It is in this regard that this paper recommends 
the utilization of flexibilities within the TRIPS agreement and calls for co-
operation amongst nations to establish a durable framework for the cre-
ation of efficient systems of healthcare in developing countries. This would 
provide developing countries with the opportunity to engage in the creation 
of self sustaining mechanisms to facilitate a greater accessibility to afford-
able healthcare; thus reducing their dependency on foreign aid. Through 
the course of this paper relevant conclusions have been drawn with regard 
to how best to aid in the actualization of the right to affordable healthcare 
through policy reformation and institutional advocacy. It is essential that 
these measures are put in place in order to empower vulnerable populations 
within the developing world to realize this right for themselves.
